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OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES AND EXTERNAL STANDARDS
OF CRIMINAL AND TORT LIABILITY: APPLICATION
OF THEORY ON THE MASSACHUSETTS BENCH
Oliver Wendell Holmes' The Common Law is a landmark
that continues to influence students of the legal process. During
the late 19th century scientific revolution, Darwin and others
challenged long-held religious and social beliefs; Holmes chal-
lenged long-held legal beliefs.1 Not content merely to define rules
of law, Holmes explained the evolution of law and predicted the
directions of growth of the legal system. He approached the law
empirically, rather than philosophically, basing his conclusions on
extensive case research. Avoiding abstract ideas, he relied instead
on analysis of measurable events such as the facts and outcomes
of past cases.
2
The purpose of this Comment is to measure a central ele-
ment of the Common Law theory-external standards of legal
liability-against all of Holmes' criminal and tort opinions from
his twenty years on the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts.3 Criminal and tort law were the primary basis of the theory
of external liability standards and therefore are particularly ap-
propriate for testing it. This Comment will discuss the meaning
of external liability standards, and will examine areas where
Holmes found the theory incorrect, as well as areas where prece-
dent, social policy, statute, or external pressure kept him from
following it. A comparison of Holmes' theory with his work on
the bench may shed some light on the difficulties of applying a
legal theory in practice.4
1. See White, The Rise and Fall of Justice Holmes, 39 U. Cm. L. REv. 51, 55-56
(1971).
2. Id. at 55.
3. Holmes was a member of the court from 1883-1902, and was appointed Chief Jus-
tice in 1899. He wrote 1,291 opinions for the court, not including per curiam opinions he
may have written. H. C. SRmVER, TnE JUDICIAL OPINIONS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 524
app. (1940). Of this total, 69 were criminal opinions. The Early Writings of 0. W. Holmes,
Jr., 44 HARV. L. REv. 717, 804-05 app. (1931). There were 237 tort opinions. Id. at 815-18
app.
4. For an analysis of all of Holmes' Massachusetts opinions in comparison with his
Common Law theory, see Tushnet, The Logic of Experience: Oliver Wendell Holmes on
the Supreme Judicial Court, 63 VA. L. REv. 975 (1977). Tushnet did not address in detail
the theory of external liability standards as applied by Holmes on the bench.
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I. THE THEORY OF EXTERNAL LIABILITY STANDARDS
The Common Law examined the growth of the legal system
and the development of legal liability. At first, wrote Holmes,
liability for personal acts was determined by subjective criteria,
because liability "started from the notion of actual intent and ac-
tual personal culpability" and resulted in retribution directed
against a blameworthy person.'
In Holmes' view, the basis of liability moved historically from
subjective to objective standards. 6 As society increased in size and
complexity, it became easier and more efficient to measure liability
against external acts-an objective standard-rather than subjective
mental states. The actor was presumed to intend the performance
and result of his act without regard to his actual intent, motive, or
state of mind, and liability resulted from overt acts measured
against a "fair average member of the community" standard of
conduct." An external standard did not completely ignore state of
mind; rather, it defined "intent" and other traditionally subjective
mental states in outward, objective terms.
Holmes did not discuss the morality of external standards. He
believed that such standards already existed, and that the test for
liability would continue to evolve from a subjective to an objective
one. He was not taking a moral stand, but reporting an empirical
observation and prediction.
In addition, Holmes attempted to develop a formula that
would predict what acts would result in legal liability. He believed
that law was prediction, and "naturally took unpredictability to be
lawlessness. The acceptance of the objective standard of liability
in tort and crime would, in his eyes, accelerate certainty, for it
would permit and encourage the judges to apply a known standard
with foreseeable regularity."0 Holmes also wanted to create a
unified theory, one without exceptions that would lead to
uncertainty.10
5. O.W. HoLmES, Tim COMMON LA w8 (M. Howe ed. 1963).
6. Id.
7. According to Mark Howe, Holmes' biographer, the shift to external standards was
caused by increasing preference for social over private interests. See Howe, Introduction
to 0. W. HOLMES, Tim COMMON LAw xxvi (M. Howe ed. 1963). Holmes spoke of a social
goal of inducing "external conformity to rule." 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 42.
8. See 0. W. HOLmES, supra note 5, at 42-43, 128.
9. M. HowE, JusrcE OLIVER WENDELL HoLMEs: Tim PROvINr YtAas 1870-1882, at 196
(1963).
10. Id. at 194.
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Specific external standards developed from community
experience applied in the courts,1 with community morality as
their basis.' 2 Initially, a standard was set by the jury, who
defined impermissible conduct, but the jury was relied on only
in cases of first impression, when dearly applicable standards
were not available. Failure to apply the standard set by the jury
in subsequent cases was, according to Holmes, "little better than
lawlessness."'13 The standard became the law, and the jury's
function was reduced to determining whether the facts in a
particular case constituted a violation of the standard. Confining
the jury's function was an essential part of Holmes' desire for
predictability.
Existing standards could be further defined, altered, or even
eliminated, as required by changing times or new social policies.'
4
The decision to reconsider a standard, said Holmes, was a matter
of law.1 After the judge instructed the jury that it was not bound
by the old standard, the jury decided whether liability resulted
from the act, as if the case were of first impression. Although this
approach conflicted with the goal of prediction in the law, it
prevented the theory from becoming too inflexible. 6
11. See O. W. HoLms, supra note 5, at 98.
12. For a discussion of some moral implications of Holmes' theory, see McKinnon,
The Secret of Mr. Justice Holmes: An Analysis, 36 A.BA.J. 261 (1950). McKinnon argues
that Holmes' theory of external liability standards was amoral and the link between mo-
rality and external standards was specious. Id. at 261-64.
13. Holmes, The Theory of Torts, 7 Am. L. Rnv. 652, 659 (1873). Holmes did not
fully advocate external standards in this pre-Common Law article. He presented a theory
in which subjective factors were determinative of liability in many tort cases. His position
on the function of juries, however, was the same in this article as it later was in The
Common Law. See 0. W. HOLMEs, supra note 5, at 97-99.
14. See 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 100-01.
15. Id.
16. Holmes wrote two opinions where the available standards were not adequate to
cover the facts of each case. In the libel case of Fay v. Harrington, 176 Mass. 270, 57
N.E. 369 (1900), a newspaper published an article allegedly implying that the plaintiff's
theater discriminated against the Irish laboring dass. Holmes affirmed the verdict for de-
fendant, holding that it was proper for the jury to decide the most likely interpretation
of the words. The existing external standard was not clearly applicable to the particular
words, so the jury decision was necessary to refine the standard for this and similar cases.
The same jury function was necessary in Connery v. Manning, 163 Mass. 44, 39 N.E.
558 (1895), an action for malicious prosecution. The plaintiff was unsuccessfully prose-
cuted on a complaint that he misrepresented the value of his collateral in obtaining goods
on credit from the defendant. The alleged misrepresentation was a statement that could
easily be interpreted in different ways and evidence was presented that the defendant was
aware of the various interpretations. Holmes reversed a directed verdict for the defendant
and held that the defendant's interpretation of the plaintiff's statement must go to the
jury as a question of fact.
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With this theoretical framework in mind, Holmes' criminal
and tort opinions may be viewed in a new light, focusing on
whether his judicial standards of liability were objective or sub-
jective, and on areas where prediction of the law's growth was
or was not borne out in practice.'7
II. CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Holmes did not argue for the application of external standards
to all crimes, in part because case law was undeveloped in some
areas. For example, larceny cases were decided on the basis of the
defendant's state of mind, because past cases did not recognize
the appropriateness of objective standards, a phenomenon that
Holmes considered a historical anomaly.' 8 Subjective liability
standards were also required in what he termed "crimes of passion,"
and in some criminal attempts, because external standards could
not adequately measure their elements or defenses.'
The jury in each of these cases considered the external evidence and decided whether
the acts required legal sanction under an existing standard. Whichever way the juries de-
cided, the outcomes refined external standards for future cases with similar acts at issue.
17. A difficulty with the interpretation of language arises in comparing Holmes'
theory with his judicial opinions. He assigned legal meanings to conventionally subjective
terms used in the law, such as "fraud," "malice," and "intent," saying that "actual wick-
edness of the kind described by the several words just mentioned is not an element in the
civil wrongs to which those words are applied." 0. W. HoAIzas, supra note 5, at 104.
Holmes converted words with moral connotations into words of overt behavior. For ex-
ample, speaking of "malice" in slander cases, he said:
[A]lthough the use of the phrase "malice" points as usual to an original moral
standard, the rule that it is presumed upon proof of speaking certain words is
equivalent to saying that the overt conduct of speaking those words may be ac-
tionable whether the consequence of damage to the plaintiff was intended or not.
Id. at 110. The opinions must be read with care; a literal reading of such language results
in a misleading impression of subjectivity.
18. See 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 58-60; text accompanying notes 40-42 infra.
19. See 0. W. HoLMEs, supra note 5, at 50-52. Of Holmes' 69 criminal opinions, the
issue of external or subjective liability standards did not arise in 62. This did not reflect
an avoidance of the issue-the cases on appeal dealt with issues unrelated to standards of
liability. For example, many concerned only the form or technical content of pleadings.
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Buckley, 145 Mass. 181, 12 N.E. 368 (1887); Commonwealth v.
Goulding, 135 Mass. 552 (1883). Others involved sufficiency of evidence to make out an
issue of fact for the jury, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Hunton, 168 Mass. 130, 46 N.E. 404
(1897); Commonwealth v. Doherty, 137 Mass. 245 (1884), or interpretation of statutory
language, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Russell, 162 Mass. 520, 39 N.E. 110 (1895); Common-
wealth v. Churchill, 136 Mass. 148 (1883).
Most of the cases dealt with fairly routine and uncontroversial matters, such as liquor
offenses, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. McCormick, 150 Mass. 270, 22 N.E. 911 (1889); Com-
monwealth v. Tabor, 138 Mass. 496 (1885); illegal gambling, see, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Swain, 160 Mass. 354, 35 N.E. 862 (1894); Commonwealth v. Sullivan, 146 Mass. 142, 15
N.E. 491 (1888); and selling margarine colored to look like butter, see, e.g., Common-
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A. Crimes of Passion
According to Holmes' theory, when a murder, for example,
was committed under some great provocation, such as jealousy,
the actor's mental state was a factor in determining liability.
20
In part, mental state was measured by an objective standard:
"There must be provocation sufficient to justify the passion, and
the law decides on general considerations what provocations are
sufficient."'" It was a two-step process: actual provocation (sub-
jective test) and sufficient provocation (objective test); both were
required for the defense to succeed. On the other hand, unpro-
voked killings, such as manslaughter, required purely external
tests of liability.2 2 Holmes did not confront any crimes of passion,
but was able to apply his theory in other homicide situations.
B. Manslaughter
An unusual manslaughter case illustrates Holmes' application
of external standards, and a simultaneous shift away from sub-
jectivity. The defendant in Commonwealth v. Pierce23 was a
self-proclaimed "physician" who ordered that a sick woman's
clothing be saturated with kerosene; as a result, the woman died
of kerosene burns. The defense-Pierce's "honest intent and expec-
tation to cure" 24-was based on Commonwealth v. Thompson,25 an
1809 case. Thompson held that liability for manslaughter arose
only when death was caused by an unlawful act, and there was "no
law which prohibits any man from prescribing for a sick person
with his consent, if he honestly intends to cure him by his pre-
scription." 26 This was a subjective standard: consideration of
wealth v. Ryberg, 177 Mass. 67, 58 N.E. 155 (1900): Commonwealth v. Kelly, 163 Mass.
169, 39 N.E. 776 (1895).
Of the remaining seven opinions, Holmes applied external standards in six. See text
accompanying notes 23-29, 31-38, 43-45, & 52-54 infra; note 54 infra. He used a subjective
standard in one. See Commonwealth v. Ryan, 155 Mass. 523, 30 N.E. 364 (1892), discussed
in text accompanying notes 46-47 infra.
20. See 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 51. Holmes said provocation could reduce
murder to manslaughter. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 50-52.
23. 138 Mass. 165 (1884).
24. Id. at 170.
25. 6 Mass. 134 (1809).
26. Id. at 139 (footnote omitted).
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"honest intent" put the defendant's actual state of mind into issue.
Holmes distinguished Thompson as not involving the degree of
recklessness present in Pierce,27 affirmed the defendant's conviction,
and approved the jury instruction that "[i]t is not necessary to
show an evil intent; if, by gross and reckless negligence, he caused
the death, he is guilty of culpable homicide." 2 In addition, Holmes
justified application of the "reasonable man" standard of civil
liability to criminal cases: "[T]he recklessness of the criminal no
less than that of the civil law must be tested by what we have
called an external standard .... [W]e cannot recognize a privilege
to do acts manifestly endangering human life, on the grounds of
good intentions alone." 29 The shift from subjective to objective
standards in Pierce reflects the public interest in developing a
standard of care for physicians. In criminal attempt cases, Holmes
predicted a similar shift, but the theory allowed an exception.
C. Attempts
Holmes defined criminal attempts as overt acts likely to cause
harm, assessed by objective standards rather than by the actor's
actual intent.30 Commonwealth v. Kennedy,81 a case of attempted
murder, illustrates this definition of attempts. The defendant had
placed poison on the underside of the crossbar of his intended vic-
tim's mustache cup. Holmes found sufficient proximity of the act to
its probable result to support the inference of the defendant's intent
that the result follow the act; since it was not an ambiguous act,
there was no need to go beyond the act to infer intent.8 2 Holmes
said that laws proscribing attempts concerned only prevention of
certain external acts and their results, regardless of the actor's
motives.8 3
The rule that attempts should be measured objectively had
an exception, however, for ostensibly innocent acts. For example,
in The Common Law, Holmes discussed the case of a man who
27. In Thompson, death by poisoning resulted from an emetic administered by a
bogus "physician." Thompson appeared to involve as much recklessness as Pierce, but be-
cause the Thompson court did not find recklessness, Holmes was able to overcome the
precedent by describing Pierce as a case of recklessness and finding that Thompson did
not predude a physician's liability for a reckless act. 138 Mass. at 177.
28. Id. at 171.
29. Id. at 177-79.
80. See 0. W. HoLMEs, supra note 5, at 54.
31. 170 Mass. 18, 48 N.E. 770 (1897).




lights a match near a haystack, intending to burn it, and then
puts the match out after realizing he was observed. The act in
itself appears innocent; it is not a clear, overt attempt at arson,
such as throwing the lighted match on the haystack. Liability
arises only because there was an accompanying actual intent to set
fire to the haystack. This type of act falls into an area where the law
cannot draw external boundary lines for innocence or guilt. Since
the actor's state of mind determined liability, evidence of actual
intent was necessary before the probability of subsequent harm
from the act could be assessed.34 Therefore, a subjective standard
governed certain attempts.
The opportunity to consider an ostensibly innocent act arose
in an attempted arson case, Commonwealth v. Peaslee,5 but
Holmes decided the case on other grounds. Peaslee had collected
combustibles in a building and then left to get an accomplice. As
they were returning to the building, Peaslee changed his mind
and turned back. According to Holmes, the act of collecting
combustibles in the building was not enough by itself to infer an
intent,386 but he did not reach the question of actual intent, because
the prosecution failed to show an ability to carry out a "present
intent. ' 37 Peaslee's decision not to return to the building made an
overt attempt at arson impossible; without an overt act there
could be no attempt. Holmes did not indicate how "present intent"
could be determined if the defendant had gone further with his
plansS8 None of Holmes' other Massachusetts opinions concerned
attempts by ostensibly innocent acts. Cases of larceny and embezzle-
ment were not as rare, however, and provide a basis for measuring
theory against practice.
D. Larceny and Embezzlement
Holmes defined larceny as a taking of property from the
possession of its owner with intent to keep it permanently.3 9
Apprehension of the thief made it unclear whether he intended to
34. See 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 54.
35. 177 Mass. 267,59 N.E. 55 (1901).
36. Id. at 273,59 N.E. at 57.
37. "[H]e must be shown to have had a present intent to accomplish the crime
without much delay, and to have had this intent at a time and place where he was able
to carry it out." Id. at 273-74, 59 N.E. at 57.
38. Holmes said he could have affirmed conviction if the indictment had charged the
solicitation of another to start the fire as the last overt act of the attempt, an external
standard. Id. at 274, 59 N.E. at 57.
39. See 0. W. HoLMES, supra note 5, at 58.
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keep the property permanently.40 Holmes said an external test
could be applied-taking the property implied the intent to keep
it-but the law's development of the definition of larceny included
actual intent as an element of liability.4' Future cases, Holmes
maintained, would eventually shift from subjective to external
standards.42 On the bench, Holmes also recognized the subjective
element in embezzlement, a crime similar to larceny. While larceny
was the taking of property in the owner's possession, embezzlement
was the taking of property not in the owner's possession. Because
a larceny charge failed if the defendant showed the alleged acts
constituted embezzlement, and vice versa, defendants often at-
tempted to have the charge dismissed for alleging the wrong crime.
The larceny/embezzlement distinction arose in Common-
wealth v. Lannan.3 An attorney misrepresented the amount of
money his client was to receive from a sale, and kept the excess for
himself. The defendant argued that his act was not larceny as
charged because the client never had possession of the excess money.
In response, Holmes applied the doctrine of constructive posses-
sion: "[I]f a party fraudulently obtains possession of goods from
the owner . . . and the owner does not part with the title,
the offense is larceny."' Since the client had legal title to the
money, actual possession was not necessary for a larceny charge.
Once past this definitional problem, Holmes disposed of the
defendant's contention that no fraud was intended by imposing an
external standard: the act of keeping the undisclosed money justi-
fied the inference of intent to defraud; proof of actual intent was
not needed. 45 Since the issue of intent was raised on appeal only in
the fraud argument, Holmes did not have to contend with the
problem of actual intent in larceny.
The subjective standard of actual intent did determine lia-
bility in the embezzlement case of Commonwealth v. Ryan.40 A
bartender was accused of putting money in his employer's cash
40. Id. at 58-59.
41. Id. at 60.
42. Id. at 59-60.
43. 153 Mass. 287, 26 N.E. 858 (1891).
44. Id. at 289, 26 N.E. at 859.
45. Holmes relied on Commonwealth v. Barry, 124 Mass. 325 (1878), in which a girl
kept money given to her by a man to buy him brandy. This was sufficient to support an
inference of intent to keep the money prior to receiving it. 153 Mass. at 289, 26 N.E. at
859.
46. 155 Mass. 523, 30 N.E. 364 (1892).
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register without ringing up the sale and later taking the money out
for himself. The defendant argued that the money passed into the
employer's possession when it entered the cash drawer, and a
subsequent taking was larceny, not embezzlement-the reverse of
the argument in Lannan. Holmes upheld the jury charge that
embezzlement was proved if the defendant actually intended to
have the money himself before he placed it in the cash drawer.
He said that "[s]uch cases are among the few in which the actual
intent of the party is legally important . . ." The standard was
subjective-the jury could either believe or disbelieve testimony
about actual intent and when it was formed.
Commonwealth v. Rubin48 presented a problem similar to
Lannan-the owner was never in actual possession of the stolen
horse-and an argument was made that a charge of larceny was
inappropriate. Holmes affirmed the conviction, without relying on
constructive possession, and dismissed the larceny/embezzlement
distinction as "merely technical. '49 More important, an external
standard, probability of future intent formed prior to an act,
supported the inference of intent to keep the horse permanently
from the owner." The change in standards from Ryan to Rubin
illustrates a progression from subjective to external liability
standards.
47. Id. at 530, 30 N.E. at 365. In an earlier embezzlement case, Holmes reversed a
conviction without setting a standard for the "fraudulent intent" necessary for liability.
He remanded the case because the acts of the defendant were not sufficient to prove em-
bezzlement, but only a step toward it, and the jury was not so instructed. The issues on
appeal did not touch on the "intent" standard, so Holmes did not discuss it. See Common-
wealth v. Este, 140 Mass. 279, 2 N.E. 769 (1885). In a case of obtaining goods by false
pretenses, Holmes was constrained by statute to approve a jury charge that the defendant
had to know his statements about the worth of the check he wrote were false, in addition
to their actually being false. However, the issue on appeal was only delivery of the
goods, so Holmes did not define the legal standard for "knowledge." See Commonwealth
v. Devlin, 141 Mass. 423, 6 N.E. 64 (1886).
48. 165 Mass. 453, 43 N.E. 200 (1896).
49. Id. at 456,43 N.E. at 201.
50. Id. A simpler inference of intent was drawn in the robbery case of Common-
wealth v. Ryan, 154 Mass, 422, 28 N.E. 289 (1891). Two men were riding on the back of a
wagon driven by a third man. One of the two grabbed the reins, stopped the wagon, and
said to the driver "'we are two to one, so give us what you've got.'" Id. at 422, 28 N.E.
at 289. The speaker was after a bottle of whiskey. He had the second defendant hold the
horse's head so the driver could not regain control, and both defendants drank from the
bottle. The second defendant argued that he did not participate by any word or act in the
first defendant's robbery. Holmes affirmed their conviction, holding that the second man's
acts-holding the horse and not repudiating the threat made to the driver-were sufficient




Prediction and unity in the criminal external standard theory
were weakened by subjective exceptions. For example, where
actual intent was a necessary element of liability in criminal
attempts, it was impossible to predict with any accuracy the out-
comes of similar cases. To say a man would be guilty of an attempt
if the jury believed he actually intended to commit a crime was a
definition of how liability was determined, but the outcome of
that case would not predict the outcome of future cases, because
the jury's subjective belief would again be the basis for determining
liability. Holmes condemned this result because it left liability to
the whim of the jury,51 but he also saw that external standards
were inappropriate where the overt act complained of did not
clearly imply an intended harm (such as attempts by ostensibly
innocent acts), or where social policy called for some consideration
of state of mind (as in crimes of passion). Although prediction and
unity were affected on the theoretical level by these subjective
exceptions, the lack of crimes of passion and ostensibly innocent
attempts in Holmes' opinions over a twenty-year period prevents a
test of these exceptions. Subjective exceptions arose directly only
in the opinions of larceny and embezzlement cases. Ryan illustrates
a subjective standard acknowledged by The Common Law,5 2 while




While the criminal theory began with exceptions, one of which
was later eliminated, the tort theory began with no exceptions and
later developed one. The Common Law applied external standards
in all tort law, but Holmes' judicial experience did not bear out
this unified theory." He amended the theory while on the bench
51. Leaving standards of conduct always to the jury "would leave all our rights and
duties throughout a great part of the law to the necessarily more or less accidental feel-
ings of a jury." 0. W. HoLrEs, supra note 5, at 101.
52. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
53. See text accompanying note 42 supra.
54. All of Holmes' 237 tort opinions were examined; four were dissenting opinions.
For this Comment, the cases were divided into two broad categories of "intentional" and
"non-intentional" torts. These categories distinguished cases where the act complained of
was a direct personal act of the defendant ("intentional") from those where the damage
was not directly attributable to a personal act ("non-intentional").
[Vol. 28
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to allow for subjectivity in the defense of privilege, which protected
acts based on certain motives. 55
A. Privilege
Social policy, Holmes believed, required that the defense of
privilege in a tort action trigger consideration of the defendant's
actual motive or intent. Certain motivations for personal acts were
deemed desirable, and harms resulting from such motivations did
not create legal liability.56 One example was honest advice: if a man
advised a friend that he thought the friend's employee was not a
good worker and should be fired, and his only motive was benefit to
the friend's business, he was not liable to the employee for loss
of his job. If, however, he were motivated by dislike of the
employee, he was liable because an act was not privileged when
its motive was vindictive. An external standard would have focused
on the result of the act and not its motive, creating a lower
threshold of liability, and discouraging the giving of honest advice.
External standards were not a consideration when privilege
was raised, because privilege was pled after an external standard
had set responsibility for the act and its result.5 7 If the actor
In the 182 "non-intentional" cases, the issue of external or subjective standards was
inapplicable because these cases had no issue of intent, motive, state of mind, "malice," or
similar attributes of the defendant. This category was characterized by five groups of
similar cases. Fifty-one were "railroad" cases; they usually involved injuries attributed to
defective or ill-designed equipment or dangerous operational procedures. See, e.g., Butler
v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R.R., 177 Mass. 191, 58 N.E. 592 (1900); Brooks v. Boston & Me. R.R.,
135 Mass. 21 (1883). Fifty-seven were employer liability cases brought by employees for
on-the-job injuries. See, e.g., Boston Woven-Hose & Rubber Co. v. Kendall, 178 Mass. 232,
59 N.E. 657 (1901); Williams v. Churchill, 137 Mass. 243 (1884). Sixty-seven were negli-
gence cases not fitting into the latter two groups. They often involved the liabilities of
landlords, retail stores, or municipalities in maintaining buildings, roads, or sidewalks.
See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Welch, 174 Mass. 486, 55 N.E. 178 (1899); Purple v. Greenfield, 138
Mass. 1 (1884). Four concerned statutory interpretation of issues other than liability stan-
dards. See, e.g., Hamer v. Eldridge, 171 Mass. 250, 50 N.E. 611 (1898). Finally, three cases
did not fit into the other four groups and did not deal with liability standards. See, e.g.,
Francis v. Rosa, 151 Mass. 532, 24 N.E. 1024 (1890) (bastardy).
Of the remaining 55 opinions, the "intentional" category, liability standards were not
at issue in 21. See, e.g., Rogers v. Dutton, 182 Mass. 187, 65 N.E. 56 (1902) (fraud); Coul-
lard v. Tecumseh Mills, 151 Mass. 85, 23 N.E. 731 (1890) (negligence). Of the remaining
34, Holmes applied external standards in 28. See text accompanying notes 72-79 infra;
note 80 & accompanying text infra; note 16 supra. He applied subjective standards in 6.
See text accompanying notes 61-71 infra; notes 68, 71 & 76 infra.
55. See Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. Rav. 1 (1894).
56. Id. at 9.
57.
The external standard, applied for the purpose of seeing whether the defendant
had notice of the probable consequences of his act, has little or nothing to do
1979]
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admitted responsibility for the result of the act, he then raised the
defense of privilege and the act itself was no longer at issue. Certain
subjective intentions or motives might make the act privileged,
even though the resulting harm was one that ordinarily the law
would punish. The jury decided whether the necessary subjective
intentions existed in the defendant's mind.
The effect of privilege was that the same act resulted in
liability in some cases but not in others. A defendant who showed
the justification of privilege was exonerated for violating the objec-
tive standard for which another was held liable in the absence of
privilege.5 8 The Common Law said the question of privilege was
decided by external standards,"0 but after more than a decade on
the bench, Holmes realized that privilege could not be defined
objectively, and he acknowledged a subjective exception for it."
Holmes was unable to convince the majority on the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts to apply a subjective standard for
privilege in a case similar to the example of a man advising a
friend to fire an employee. In May v. Wood,"' the charge was
"malicious" inducement of an employer to fire an employee. The
majority affirmed a directed verdict for the defendant on pro-
cedural grounds, saying that "the statements made should be
substantially set out in the declaration, in order that the court may
see whether any such effect as is alleged can reasonably be attrib-
uted to the statements .. ". . I' In other words, the majority held
that an objective standard should be applied to the statements
to determine if there were a valid cause of action. Holmes dis-
sented, saying the only relevant factors were the intended result
and the fact of its occurrence. He argued for a subjective standard
of liability tied to the idea of privilege: "[A]n action will lie . . .
with the question of privilege. The defendant is assumed to have had notice of




59. See 0. W. HOLMES, supra note 5, at 111.
60.
rhe intentional infliction of temporal damage, or the doing of an act mani-
festly likely to inflict such damage, and inflicting it, is actionable if done without
just cause. When the defendant escapes, the court is of the opinion that he has
acted with just cause .... In these instances, the justification is that the defen-
dant is privileged knowingly to inflict the damage complained of.
Holmes, supra note 55, at 3 (footnote omitted).
61. 172 Mass. 11, 51 N.E. 191 (1898).
62. Id. at 14,51 N.E. at 192.
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as well when the result is effected by persuasion as when it is
accomplished by fraud or force, if the harm is inflicted simply
from malevolence and without some justifiable cause, such as
competition in trade." 63 Holmes' position was that motive deter-
mined whether there was liability for an act's result, regardless of
the nature of the act. It was therefore immaterial whether the
statements made to the employer were recited in the complaint.
This attention to motive rather than external acts was the opposite
of the general theory of external standards of liability, but Holmes
limited the effect of motives to situations where social policy indi-
cated a privilege might exist.6
Three years after May, Holmes wrote the majority opinion in
a similar case, Moran v. Dunphy05 He disposed of the May pro-
cedural problem by allowing the plaintiff to amend his complaint
to include the alleged statements that led to his discharge. He then
repeated the reasoning of his May dissent that result and motive
were the only real issues in such cases, regardless of the means
used, 66 and added that "'motives may determine the question of
liability; that while intentional interference of the kind supposed
may be privileged if for certain purposes, yet if due only to malevo-
lence it must be answered for.' "67 The external act created liability
only when certain motives (such as malevolence in the conventional
sense) were present; other motives (such as business competition or
honest advice) created no liability for the same act. The defendant
prevailed if he showed his intentions were in the best interests of
the employer and were not based in any ill will toward the plaintiff.
The test of the defendant's intent was subjective; actual intent,
rather than intent implied from an objective act, was at issue.,8
While cases such as May and Moran dealt with business rela-
tionships, privilege also protected certain behavior in personal
63. Id. at 14-15, 51 N.E. at 192-93.
64. See Holmes, supra note 55, at 3.
65. 177 Mass. 485, 59 N.E. 125 (1901).
66. Id. at 487,59 N.E. at 126.
67. Id. (quoting Plant v. Woods, 176 Mass. 492, 57 N.E. 1011 (1900)).
68. A similar test was applied in Squires v. Wason Manufacturing Co., 182 Mass. 137,
65 N.E. 32 (1902). The defendant was charged with "malicious libel" of plaintiff's title
for a patented switch. Defendant was alleged to have claimed more rights in the patent
than it actually had. Holmes affirmed the verdict for defendant, holding that the case was
properly submitted to the jury. There was sufficient evidence to raise the issue of privilege
and "not only did the defendant have reasonable ground for its assertion but there is no
evidence that it did not believe it or that it made it for any other than business reasons."
Id. at 141, 65 N.E. at 34.
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relations. The defendants in Tasker v. Stanley, 9 an action for
alienation of a wife's affections, maintained that the advice they
gave the wife was given in good faith and intended for the benefit
of both husband and wife. They did not deny that the advice
induced the separation; instead, they relied on a right to give honest
advice as a privileged justification for their acts. Holmes upheld
the admissibility of subjective testimony for the privilege defense:
If the defendants did intend to induce a separation, they had a
right to show that their advice was given honestly, with a view to
the welfare of both parties.... [I]n order to make a man who has
no special influence or authority answerable for mere advice of
this kind because it is followed, we think that it ought to appear
that the advice was not honestly given, that it did not represent
his real opinions, or that it was given from malevolent
motives .... 70
In Tasker, the privilege protected behavior that would have
resulted in liability if an external standard were applied. In this
and other privilege cases, Holmes avoided the inequities that
could result from application of objective standards by allowing the
defense of privilege to protect acts based on socially desirable
motivations. 71
B. Dissents from Subjectivity
Holmes twice dissented from a subjective liability standard
imposed by his court. Privilege was not applicable in either case,
he maintained, because the behavior involved was not arguably
socially protected. The majority in Nash v. Minnesota Title
Insurance and Trust Co., 2 a case of false representations in
business dealings, upheld the admission of defendant's testimony
that he acted honestly and intended no fraud by his words.78
69. 153 Mass. 148, 26 N.E. 417 (1891).
70. Id. at 150, 26 N.E. at 418. Holmes also said the wife's leaving was an intervening
act: "True statements and honest advice would have done no harm but for the subse-
quent act of the wife, an independent and responsible person." Id. at 149, 26 N.E. at 418.
71. Holmes even protected an honest suspicion of another's guilt. In the slander case
of Billings v. Fairbanks, 139 Mass. 66, 29 N.E. 544 (1885), the defendant employer told two
friends of the plaintiff that he knew the plaintiff stole money from him, but had no
proof. Holmes reversed the verdict for plaintiff, saying that an honest suspicion was
enough to keep the statement within the defendant's privilege, even though hc had no
proof and admitted he could be wrong; full belief in plaintiff's guilt was not necessary to
make the statements privileged. Id. at 69, 29 N.E. at 546.
72. 163 Mass. 574,40 N.E. 1039 (1895).
73.
[1]nasmuch as the question involved is what was his state of mind, and his actual
intent as distinguished from his apparent intent, he is entitled to explain his lan-
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Holmes wrote a strong dissent: "The representation was not made
in casual talk, but in a business matter . . . . When a man makes
such a representation, he knows that others will understand his
words according to their usual and proper meaning, and not by
the accident of what he happens to have in his head ..... 74Nash
was an example of case law before the shift to external standards;
75
while the majority looked to actual intent, Holmes looked to the
ordinary, objective meaning of the words used by the defendant,
the standard used by the court in later fraud cases. 6
Holmes' dissent in Hanson v. Globe Newspaper7 7 a libel case,
was a better sign of Massachusetts law than the majority opinion.
The defendant accidentally used the plaintiff's name in an article
about someone else and the majority held for defendant based on
lack of intent, because the words were not in fact printed about
the plaintiff. Yet, Massachusetts courts had long held that intent
was immaterial in libel cases. That it was an "accidental" libel was
the only thing distinguishing Hanson from other libel cases.78
Holmes' position was that it did "not matter that the defendant
did not intend to injure the plaintiff, if that was the manifest
tendency of his words."7 9 As in Nash, Holmes advocated external
standards in contrast to the majority's subjectivity. In both dissents,
Holmes did not find any compelling social policy reasons to deviate
from objective standards, as he did in cases involving privilege.
He did not consider libel or false representations to be areas in
-which the law could find protected motivations.
guage as best he can, if it is susceptible of explanation, and to testify what was
in his mind in reference to the subject to which the alleged fraud relates.
Id. at 580, 40 N.E. at 1040.
74. Id. at 586, 40 N.E. at 1042.
75. Through 1878, actual fraudulent intent was usually a necessary element for lia-
bility. See, e.g., Tucker v. White, 125 Mass. 844 (1878). The area was in transition until
the late 1890's, when external standards became consistently determinative. See, e.g.,
Weeks v. Currier, 172 Mass. 53, 51 N.E. 416 (1898); Conant v. Alvord, 166 Mass. 311, 44
N.E. 250 (1896) (both non-Holmes opinions).
76. In Latham v. Aldrich, 166 Mass. 156, 44 N.E. 137 (1896), Holmes preferred to
apply the standard of his dissent in Nash, but was constrained by the Nash majority
opinion to affirm a verdict for defendants based on their subjective belief in the truth of
their representations. After Latham, the objective standard of Holmes' dissent in Nash
was representative of the shift to external standards in Massachusetts fraud cases. See
note 75 supra.
77. 159 Mass. 293, 34 N.E. 462 (1893).
78. See, e.g., Curtis v. Mussey, 72 Mass. (6 Gray) 261 (1856); note 80 = accompanying
text infra.




The privilege exception to Holmes' unified tort theory did
not significantly detract from the theory's power of prediction."
The subjective defense of privilege arose only after external
standards imposed responsibility for an act; it was a justification
for an act, not a denial that the act occurred or was intended. In
addition, it arose only in connection with business and personal
behavior that the law protected for social policy reasons. When
privilege was an issue, Holmes uniformly advocated a subjective
liability standard; when privilege was not an issue, Holmes con-
sistently applied external standards. The small number of his
dissents indicates that subjectivity was infrequently applied by his
fellow judges. Although not unified in practice, the theory as
amended by the subjective privilege exception was highly predic-
tive of Holmes' tort opinions.
80. Holmes had no difficulty applying external liability standards in his tort opin-
ions not discussed in text. External standards were used in cases of fraud, libel, malicious
prosecution, conversion, interference with chattels, and negligence:
Fraud. The usual fraud case involved allegations of fraudulent representations by
the defendant that induced the plaintiff to purchase goods or services. Holmes applied the
standard of reasonable reliance: whether a reasonable man would be induced by the de-
fendant's representations to part with his money or property. In several cases Holmes
either affirmed liability based on a standard of reasonable reliance, or sent the case back
for trial for the standard to be applied. See, e.g., Emmons v. Alvord, 177 Mass. 466, 59
N.E. 126 (1901); Windram v. French, 151 Mass. 547, 24 N.E. 914 (1890). The reasonable
reliance rule allowed a defendant to escape liability even when his representations were
made in bad faith. See Deming v. Darling, 148 Mass. 504, 20 N.E. 107 (1889) (average
community members should know better than to rely on the everyday inducements of
salesmen, who by nature were not to be entirely trusted or given too much credibility).
In other cases, the defendant's actual state of mind or intent was immaterial; liability
arose from what he should have known based on a reasonable man standard. See, e.g.,
Corey v. Eastman, 166 Mass. 279, 44 N.E. 217 (1896); Cutter v. Hamlen, 147 Mass. 471, 18
N.E. 597 (1888). But see notes 75-76 & accompanying text supra.
Libel. See, e.g., Haynes v. Clinton Printing Co., 169 Mass. 512, 48 N.E. 275 (1897);
Hurley v. Fall River Daily Herald Publishing Co., 128 Mass. 334 (1885). Holmes indicated
that libel was susceptible to the defense of privilege. See Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper
Co., 154 Mass. 238, 245, 28 N.E. 1, 4 (1891).
Malicious prosecution. There was no malice in the legal sense when there was ob.
jective and reasonable belief by the defendant that his complaint against the plaintiff was
valid. See, e.g., Gray v. Parke, 162 Mass. 582, 39 N.E. 191 (1895); Allen v. Codman, 139
Mass. 136,29 N.E. 537 (1885).
Conversion. See Burns v. Lane, 138 Mass. 350 (1885).
Interference with chattels. See Livermore v. Batchelder, 141 Mass. 179, 5 N.E. 275
(1886).
Negligence. Holmes wrote majority opinions in two negligence cases where the al-
leged negligent act resulted in almost immediate consequences to the plaintiff. See Den-





Holmes' performance on the Massachusetts bench was highly
consistent with his Common Law theory of external liability
standards in criminal and tort law. His criminal theory was never
unified, but was predictive of his judicial opinions. The criminal
cases he considered were not diverse enough to test all aspects of
the theory, but they illustrate the accuracy of his position on
subjectivity in larceny cases, including the predicted shift to ex-
ternal standards.
In tort, Holmes began with a unified theory but later amended
it to allow for subjectivity in the privilege defense. He recognized
that social policy at times demanded subjectivity to protect some
business and personal behavior. The privilege defense was the only
area in which the Common Law tort theory did not apply in
practice. Perhaps because of his desire for unification, for no
exceptions, The Common Law overlooked the pressure of social
policy to protect certain acts regardless of their results when based
on certain motivations.
Sitting on a multiple-judge court, Holmes was under pressure
to write opinions with which the majority could agree. His many
majority opinions based on external liability standards indicate a
general acceptance by the court of his theory; his infrequent dis-
sents from subjective standards indicate that his fellow judges also
applied external standards.
The theory of external liability standards was reliable in
criminal and tort law for predicting Holmes' judicial performance
in Massachusetts. It failed to work as a unified theory, but allowed
only a small range of exceptions. Where liability standards were
at issue, the theory was predictive in the overwhelming majority of
Holmes' criminal and tort opinions.
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